Privacy in Biometric Systems by Al-Assam, Hisham et al.
H. Al-Assam, T. Kuseler, S. Jassim and S. Zeadally, “Privacy in Biometric Systems”, in S. Zeadally & M. Badra (eds), Privacy in a Digital, Networked World: Technologies, Implications 




Privacy in Biometric Systems 
Hisham Al-Assam, Torben Kuseler, Sabah Jassim 
Applied Computing Department, University of Buckingham, Buckingham, 
MK18 1EG, UK 
 
Sherali Zeadally 
College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY, 40506, USA 
  
H. Al-Assam, T. Kuseler, S. Jassim and S. Zeadally, “Privacy in Biometric Systems”, in S. Zeadally & M. Badra (eds), Privacy in a Digital, Networked World: Technologies, Implications 
and Solutions, Springer, ISBN 978-3-31908469-5, pp. 235-263, October 2015 
1. Introduction 
Biometrics are physiological and/or behavioral characteristics of a person that have been used to 
provide an automatic proof of identity in a growing list of applications including crime/terrorism 
fighting, forensics, access and border control, securing e-/m-commerce transactions and service 
entitlements. In recent years, a great deal of research into a variety of new and traditional biometrics 
has widened the scope of investigations beyond improving accuracy into mechanisms that deal with 
serious concerns raised about the potential misuse of collected biometric data. Despite the long list of 
biometrics’ benefits, privacy concerns have become widely shared due to the fact that every time the 
biometric of a person is checked, a trace is left that could reveal personal and confidential 
information. In fact, biometric-based recognition has an inherent privacy problem as it relies on 
capturing, analyzing, and storing personal data about us as individuals. For example, biometric 
systems deal with data related to the way we look (face, iris), the way we walk (gait), the way we talk 
(speaker recognition), the way we write (handwriting), the way we type on a keyboard (keystroke), 
the way we read (eye movement), and many more. Privacy has become a serious concern for the 
public as biometric systems are increasingly deployed in many applications ranging from accessing 
our account on a Smartphone or computer to border control and national biometric cards on a very 
large scale. For example, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has issued 56 million 
biometric cards as of January 2014 [1], where each biometric card holds templates of the 10 fingers, 
the two irises and the face. An essential factor behind the growing popularity of biometrics in recent 
years is the fact that biometric sensors have become a lot cheaper as well as easier to install and 
handle. CCTV cameras are installed nearly everywhere and almost all Smartphones are equipped with 
a camera, microphone, fingerprint scanner, and probably very soon, an iris scanner.  
Biometrics can be a very effective tool to keep us safe and secure, prevent individuals from applying 
for multiple passports or driving licences, and keep the bad guys out or under control. However, the 
fact that we are surrounded by so many biometric sensors does limit our privacy in one way or 
another. The price we might have to pay for using many biometrics-reliant applications such as access 
control to a building, authorizing payments in supermarkets and public transports is the loss of 
privacy as a result of being tracked in almost all of our daily life activities. Furthermore, recent 
research into biometrics shows that more and more personal information can be revealed from 
biometric data such as gender, age, ethnicity, and even some critical health problems such as diabetes, 
vision problems, Alzheimer’s disease, etc. Such confidential information might be used, for example, 
to discriminate between individuals when it comes to insurance, jobs, border entry enforcement etc.  
This chapter is mainly concerned with privacy issues and solutions surrounding the use of biometrics 
as a means of recognizing individuals. As biometric security and biometric privacy are strongly 
related, it is useful to highlight the difference between these two topics first. Biometric security is 
concerned with protecting biometric data against theft for impersonation of the owner of the biometric 
data. Biometric privacy is concerned with preventing misuse of the biometric system for purposes of 
tracing and gaining information that may result in the person’s loss of civil rights, discrimination 
against the person, victimization and/or even denial of access to services. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; section 2 provides essential background information 
on biometrics while section 3 discusses several privacy concerns about biometrics. Privacy solutions 
proposed to address these concerns are then explained in section 4. Outstanding challenges and 
opportunities for future research directions are discussed in section 5. 
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2. Background on Biometrics 
A reliable identity management system is a key component to prevent identity theft and satisfies the 
increased security requirements in a wide range of applications ranging from controlling international 
border crossings to accessing remotely stored personal information and assets. Establishing the 
identity of a person is a key task in any such identity management system. Typically, there are three 
ways to establish the identity of an individual, each of which has its own advantages and 
limitations[2]: 
 Knowledge-based authentication, or “something you know”, that typically relies on a memorized 
password or PIN. A random and long password offers a strong security mechanism for user 
authentication. However, in practice, humans have difficulties in memorizing complex passwords, 
and passwords that they can easily remember are often short and therefore simple to guess or 
determined by a brute-force / dictionary attack.  
 Object-based authentication, or “something you have”, which relies on the physical possession of 
an object, such as a token. The main drawback of a physical token is that, when lost or stolen, an 
impostor can gain unauthorized access.  
 Identity-based authentication, or “something you are”, i.e. biometrics. Biometric-based 
authentication offers an advantage over other authentication factors in that a legitimate user does 
not need to remember or carry anything. Furthermore, biometric-based authentication is known to 
be more reliable than traditional authentication due to the fact that it is directly linked with the 
identity of individuals. However, there exist several challenges, as we explain later in this chapter, 
which make biometric systems far from perfect. For example, unlike other credentials such as 
PINs, passwords, or smart cards, once biometric related information is compromised, it is 
impossible to make this information private again. 
 
Biometric systems aim to identify or verify individuals’ identity based on physical characteristics 
(e.g., face, iris, fingerprint, DNA, or hand geometry), and/or behavioral characteristics (e.g. speech, 
gait, or signature). A typical biometric system has two stages, enrolment and recognition. Figure 1 
illustrates the process of the biometric enrolment stage, in which a user starts by presenting their 
biometric data to a biometric sensor (usually in a controlled environment). If the quality of the 
captured biometric sample is found to be adequate, the enrolment process proceeds to a pre-
processing procedure to prepare the sample for the next step. A feature extraction technique is then 
used to extract a digital discriminating feature vector of the individual, called Biometric Template 
(BT), which will then be stored (often also called “enrolled”) alongside the individual’s identifier (ID) 
in a database. 
 
Figure 1: A typical enrolment stage of a biometric system (the face image was used from the Extended Yale 
Face Database B [3])  
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At the recognition stage, biometric systems can function in two modes depending on the application 
context, namely authentication or identification mode. 
 
2.1 Biometric-Based Authentication  
Biometric-based authentication (also known as verification) is a one-to-one comparison of a freshly 
captured biometric sample(s), known as query, against an enrolled BT as illustrated in Figure 2. In 
this mode, a user claims an identity and the biometric system aims to verify the authenticity of the 
claimed identity (e.g., the system answers the question: “Are you who you say you are?”). For 
example, authentication might be used when a user wants to access his/her bank account or computer. 
The matching process uses a distance or similarity function to calculate a score indicating the 
similarity between the stored BT and the fresh feature vector extracted from the query sample. If the 
matching score is high enough, i.e. close enough to the enrolled template, the biometric system grants 
access to the user. Otherwise the requested access is rejected. The term “high enough” is determined 
by the administrator depending on the level of tolerance necessary for the specific application. This 
allows the system administrator to adjust the rates of false acceptance (i.e. wrongly accepted 
imposters as genuine users) and false rejection (i.e., wrongly rejected genuine users) to the desired 
levels. Typically, there is a trade-off between the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and the False 
Rejection Rate (FRR), in which the reduction of one rate causes an increase in the other. Most 
biometric systems are configured to be highly secure by maintaining a very low (e.g. 1 in 10,000) 
FAR and an acceptable FRR. In an access control system, for example, it will generally be less 
problematic to have a false rejection by asking the genuine user to re-scan their biometric, rather than 
a false acceptance in which an unauthorized individual will be granted access. 
Figure 2. Typical biometric system in authentication mode 
2.2 Biometric-Based Identification 
Biometric-based identification is a one-to-many comparison of the query against all templates in the 
database as illustrated in Figure 3. In this mode, a biometric system aims to identify an individual by 
searching the set of available identities or the system returns ‘Not enrolled’ if the matching module of 
the biometric system cannot find the identity. Identification functionality can be further classified into 
positive and negative identification. In positive identification, an individual attempts to positively 
identify themselves to the system without explicitly claiming an identity (i.e., the system answers the 
question: “Are you someone who is known to the system?”). Positive identification might be deployed 
for example to grant access to resources such as buildings or computers where the system knows the 
set of enrolled users. In contrast, in negative identification (also known as screening), an individual 
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attempts to conceal their true identity and the system aims to answer the question: “Are you who you 
say you are not?”. Screening might be used by national border agencies to check if a passenger’s 
identity is on a watch-list or by authorities to prevent issuing multiple national ID cards, passports, or 
driving licences to a single individual.  
Figure 3. Typical biometric system in identification mode 
Biometric systems such as face recognition can be deployed in identification and authentication 
modes, depending on the application. For example, face-based authentication can be used to provide 
access control (i.e. letting the genuine person in), while face-based identification can also be applied 
as a ‘watch list’ system to ﬁnd some particular individuals in a crowd, i.e. keeping the targeted people 
out. 
2.3 Challenges in Biometric Systems 
Over the years, a large number of biometric modalities (also called biometric traits) together with a 
variety of feature extraction and matching schemes have been investigated. The suitability of any 
biometric modality for an application depends on several factors such as universality, uniqueness, 
invariance over time, measurability, usability, and cost [4]. The challenges in biometric research 
activities have expanded recently to include the maintenance of privacy and security of biometric 
systems beside the traditional work to improve accuracy, scalability, and usability. In other words, the 
challenge in biometrics is to design a system that is highly accurate, easily scalable to large datasets, 
convenient to use, and secure at the same time. In what follows, several challenges of biometric 
systems are briefly explained, leaving further detailed discussions on biometric privacy concerns to 
section 3. 
 
2.3.1 Biometric Accuracy 
An ideal biometric system should have perfect accuracy, i.e. it always recognizes genuine users and 
rejects imposters correctly. However, in practice, a biometric system can make four types of errors: 
i) False Non-Match Rate (FNMR), also known as False Rejection Rate (FRR): it occurs when 
two samples, for example collected at different times, of the same biometric modality of an 
individual are not recognized as a match. 
ii) False Match Rate (FMR), also known as False Acceptance Rate (FAR): it occurs when two 
samples from different individuals are incorrectly recognized as a match. 
iii) Failure to Enrol Rate (FTER): it occurs when an individual is unable to present the required 
biometric modalities (for example because of a finger or hand cut), is unable to interact 
correctly with the sensor, or the captured biometric samples quality is very poor. 
iv) Failure to Capture Rate (FTCR): it occurs when a biometric sample provided by an 
individual during the recognition stage cannot be acquired or processed reliably. 
 
In practice, these biometric errors can occur due to the following factors [5]: 
H. Al-Assam, T. Kuseler, S. Jassim and S. Zeadally, “Privacy in Biometric Systems”, in S. Zeadally & M. Badra (eds), Privacy in a Digital, Networked World: Technologies, Implications 
and Solutions, Springer, ISBN 978-3-31908469-5, pp. 235-263, October 2015 
 Noisy sensor data: defective or improperly maintained sensors can lead to the capture of low 
quality and noisy biometric samples, which results in a significant reduction in the recognition 
accuracy by increasing the FRR of the biometric system.  
 Non-universality: a biometric modality can be considered universal when every individual in a 
target population is able to present the biometric modality for recognition. Although universality 
is an essential requirement, not all biometric modalities are perfectly universal. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has reported that it is not possible to obtain good 
quality fingerprint images from two percent of the population, for example people with hand-
related disabilities, manual workers with many cuts and bruises on their fingertips, and people 
with very oily or dry fingers [6]. Non-universality leads to higher FTER and FTCR in a biometric 
system. 
 Inter-class similarity: this term is used to refer to similarity of biometric samples from different 
individuals. It is strongly linked with the uniqueness of biometric features and is indicative of 
discriminative ability of the biometric modality (i.e., the greater the inter-class similarity the 
higher the FMRs). 
 Intra-Class variation: typically, two biometric samples of the same individual are always 
different, which results in FNM errors explained earlier. These intra-class variations may be due 
to improper interaction of the user with the sensor (e.g., changes in rotations or poses), changes in 
environmental conditions such as lighting conditions and inherent changes in the biometric 
modality such appearance changes due to ageing or facial hair.  
 Biometric scalability: Ideally, the number of enrolled individuals should have no significant 
effect on the performance of the biometric systems in terms of both accuracy and speed. When a 
biometric system is set up to function in the authentication mode, scalability is not a problem 
because each authentication attempt involves one-to-one matching i.e. matching the query with 
the stored template of an individual. However, the number of enrolled individuals has crucial 
impact on the performance of biometric systems in the identification mode, where one-to-many 
matching is required to have a biometric sample identified. For example, if the size of a database 
is a million, and each matching requires 1 millisecond, then the time required to identify one 
individual would be more than 16 minutes. Therefore, biometric identification systems that 
operate on large scale databases involve some kind of filtering or indexing based on extrinsic 
(e.g., gender, ethnicity, age, etc.) or intrinsic (e.g., fingerprint pattern class) factors to prune the 
search procedure [7]. 
 
2.3.2 Security and Privacy of Biometric Systems 
Public acceptance of biometric systems has a crucial impact on their success due to 
potential/perception of misuse of the collected biometric data. The growing deployment of biometric 
systems as a proof of identity tool for access control to physical facilities, entitlement to services, and 
in the fight against crime and terrorism has become a necessity in modern days, but it is also 
becoming a source of privacy and security concerns. Traditionally, the focus of biometrics research 
has been on accuracy, speed, cost, and robustness challenges but gradually the scope widened to 
security and privacy issues of biometric systems. Questions like: “What if my biometric data has been 
stolen or misused?” have recently attracted attention not only to reassure users about privacy intrusion 
but also to prevent misuse of stolen data. 
 
Although a biometric-based authentication system is known to be more reliable than traditional 
authentication schemes, the system is subject to failure due to intrinsic factors mentioned earlier or 
due to adversary attacks. The security of biometric systems can be undermined in various ways. For 
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example, a biometric template can be replaced by an impostor’s template in a system database or be 
stolen and replayed [8]. As a result, the impostor can gain unauthorized access to whatever the owner 
has authorized access to. Moreover, it has been shown that it is possible to create a physical spoof 
starting from biometric templates [5]. For example, a “hill climbing attack” on a biometric system can 
be used to generate a good approximation of the target template in a finite number of iterations [9]. It 
is also possible to reconstruct fingerprint images from standard templates, which might then fool the 
fingerprint recognition system [10]. Furthermore, certain biometric data is not secret and can be easily 
acquired without the knowledge of the user. Individuals usually unintentionally leave (poor-quality) 
fingerprints everywhere such as on a glass or a hidden camera can capture an image of a face or iris 
[11]. In fact, the level of secrecy and privacy varies greatly among different biometric modalities 
(e.g., the covert acquisition of face images or voice samples is much easier compared to collecting 
retina or palm vein samples). The effect of all these attacks on the security and acceptability of 
biometrics are not difficult to imagine and their consequences are far from limited to individuals. 
However, the related privacy concerns of such attacks and misuses of a system by insiders and/or 
secondary users are far from obvious. Section 3 discusses these biometric privacy concerns in more 
detail. 
 
2.4 Multi-Modal and Multi-Factor Biometric Recognition 
Multi-modal and/or multi-factor biometric solutions have been proposed to overcome most of the 
aforementioned challenges that could degrade the performance of a biometric system. Multi-modal 
systems rely on combining two or more biometric modalities to establish the identity of an individual. 
For example, face, voice, and signature were combined together in the EU-funded SecurePhone FP6 
Project [12] to provide a strong mean of authentication for mobile devices. Multi-modal biometrics 
have been deployed in a wide range of applications such as border entry/exit, access control, law 
enforcement, and network security. It has been demonstrated that using a combination of biometric 
modalities can significantly improve recognition accuracy by reducing FNMR and FMR. In addition, 
such an approach provides a secondary means of recognition if biometric samples of sufficient quality 
cannot be acquired from a particular individual. On the other hand, multi-factor biometric systems 
typically combine biometric data with knowledge-based and/or object-based authentication factors to 
produce a single representation of individuals. Multi-factor recognition can be very effective to 
improve recognition accuracy and is at the same time very easy to implement. For example, face 
biometric recognition can be combined with a 4-digit PIN to significantly lower false acceptance 
rates. More details on exploiting multi-factor recognition as a means for generating 
cancellable/revocable templates to improve the privacy of biometric systems will be presented in 
section 4. 
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3. Privacy Concerns With Biometrics  
The growing number of applications that use biometrics coupled with the increased capabilities of 
biometric sensors in terms of resolution, accuracy, and capturing biometric data unobtrusively, 
introduces new challenging problems for maintaining privacy. In the past, fingerprints were only used 
to identify potential suspects at crime scenes, i.e. the number of collected, analyzed, and stored 
fingerprints was relatively small. Nowadays, thousands of applications and devices use fingerprints to 
identify legitimate users. For example, Apple’s latest iPhone generation, the iPhone 5s, features 
“Touch ID”, a fingerprint identity sensor that allows iPhone users to use their fingerprint instead of a 
PIN code to unlock their iPhones. Another Smartphone example is the “Vital Signs Camera - Philips” 
app[13], already downloaded by hundreds of thousands of users. This app allows you to “Measure 
your heart rate and breathing rate from a distance, simply by using the camera of your iPad or 
iPhone!”. Although the accuracy of the taken measurements might be not as good as measurements 
from dedicated heart rate monitors, these apps enable nearly everybody to easily and extensively 
collect sensitive biomedical data of any person in their proximity. 
Improved sensor technology has also an impact on maintaining/undermining privacy, in particular for 
biometric sensors that can work and collect data remotely (i.e., from a distance) without the 
individual’s consent. Today, many of us (i.e., everybody living in an urban area) are monitored 
regularly. In 2011, it was estimated that on average a citizen of London, UK, is caught around 100 
times per day on a CCTV camera. This number is expected to increase due to continued reduction in 
the cost of CCTV camera production, installation, maintenance and automatic data analyses.  
The ease with which biometric data can be collected, processed, and stored has led to a large and fast 
growing number of huge biometric datasets on local (e.g., individual companies), national (e.g., 
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)) and international (e.g., 
European fingerprint database (EURODAC)) levels. This ever-increasing amount of information 
available about a human person was firstly named by Irma van der Ploeg as the “informatization of 
the body” [2]. This growing digitization of the human body away from its natural, very diverse form 
of physical existence into standardized digital code and information “may eventually affect 
embodiment and [human] identity as such” and finally offend human dignity [3]. Undoubtedly, recent 
advances in surveillance and sensors technologies will rapidly accelerate the speed by which this fully 
digitized and “informatized” body will become reality. It is questionable if fair information principles, 
and here in particular, the principle of proportionality stating “that identification systems should 
only be implemented if the benefits are worth the social costs, including the invasion of privacy, loss 
of autonomy, social discrimination, or imposition of conformity”, are always respected [4]. It is more 
likely that technology advances will increase the risk of misuse of the available information as a result 
of unethical and/or illegal practices, if the users’ sensitive data and privacy is not adequately 
protected. 
However, it is important to note that it is the utilization of the biometric system that determines the 
impact on privacy, not the biometric modality itself [5]. For example, a company could legitimately 
use a face image recognition system to restrict access to sensitive and private company data. Also, 
face images from a CCTV camera could be used to identify potential suspects at a crime scene. It is 
worth noting that the same biometric modality (face) is used in different applications; once to protect 
privacy, and once to infringe it. 
The privacy concerns about biometrics emerge from four main biometric data misuses that are 
described below. It is important to highlight that the threat to privacy can either arise from the inside 
or from the outside of the involved systems and organizations. A threat coming from the inside can be 
for example a person (e.g., a system administrator), who works for one of the involved organizations. 
H. Al-Assam, T. Kuseler, S. Jassim and S. Zeadally, “Privacy in Biometric Systems”, in S. Zeadally & M. Badra (eds), Privacy in a Digital, Networked World: Technologies, Implications 
and Solutions, Springer, ISBN 978-3-31908469-5, pp. 235-263, October 2015 
These people are often called secondary users. A threat from the outside can be for example an 
attacker, who has no further relation to the involved organizations or individuals and tries to attack the 
systems just for his benefit (e.g., to sell the stolen or collected private information). 
Unnecessary and unauthorized collection 
To preserve the individual’s privacy as much as possible, the amount of data collected should be 
always minimized. Biometric systems should only be used in scenarios where the system or 
organization security will benefit from the installation. For example, if access to a specific area in a 
company does not need to be protected, no fingerprint or face recognition system should be installed 
at the entry points to that area. However, additional systems of that kind are often installed by 
companies, just to monitor and record employees’ behavior. This is a typical example of a privacy 
threat coming from the inside. 
 
Unauthorized and concealed collection of biometric data (e.g., via hidden cameras) is another privacy 
risk and often performed from the outside. As mentioned before, cameras are now widely used to 
monitor our everyday life. Very often, people benefit from this monitoring, for example traffic jams 
or over-crowded underground stations can be easily and quickly detected and such information can be 
passed on to the other passengers to avoid these situations. However, this extensive data collection 
and analysis can also lead to privacy concerns. In 2012, politicians in Argentina announced that they 
will create a new centralized biometric database containing face images of Argentina’s citizens. This 
announcement immediately raised resistance and critics pointed out that this new system could 
discourage political engagement and protests, because the database could also be used to help identify 
undesired demonstrators and suppress political activities. Another example of a biometric related 
privacy concern occurs in night clubs and bars in cities like Chicago and San Francisco. These bars 
use their security cameras now together with face detection software to broadcast real-time 
information on the number of male and female visitors in the club, together with their average ages 
groups. This information can then be used by others to decide which bar to visit. 
 
Unauthorized use and application of cross-matching 
A further privacy concern arises from the fact that an individual’s biometric data collected for 
different purposes and unrelated applications can be cross-referenced by comparing stored biometric 
templates. This allows, for example, the linking of bank datasets and financial records to medical 
related datasets, if both involved organizations (i.e. banks and medical agencies) hold the same 
biometric record/template of that individual. The actual sharing could either happen if an insider of 
one organization illegitimately shares the sensitive data with the other organization for his own 
financial benefits [14], or if both organizations agree to share the data within a strategic relationship 
benefitting both of them [15]. An example of a negative consequence of this type of 
information/application cross-matching and data sharing could be that a mortgage application of an 
individual is declined. The mortgage issuing bank has automatic access to the person’s financial status 
via its own user records. If this bank has now also access to the applicant’s medical records, a 
combined assessment could indicate that the mortgage risk is too high and the application is declined. 
Instead, an assessment of the financial status only could lead to an acceptance of the mortgage 
application. 
 
Function or purpose creep 
Function or purpose creep occurs when the biometric information collected by an application for one 
specific purpose (e.g., to give access to certain material or places) is also used in a completely 
different application scenario without the user’s consent. One famous example of a large scale 
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biometric function creep is the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) fingerprint database for 
identifying asylum seekers [16]. The original purpose of this database was to “help the effective 
application of the Dublin convention on handling claims for asylum.” However, soon after the 
database was established, access to the data was also granted to other police and law enforcement 
agencies. This function creep then finally led to an official statement of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) saying that [17]: 
“Just because the data has already been collected, it should not be used for another purpose which 
may have a far-reaching negative impact on the lives of individuals. To intrude upon the privacy of 
individuals and risk stigmatizing them requires strong justification and the Commission has simply 
not provided sufficient reason why asylum seekers should be singled out for such treatment.” 
 
Similar concerns were also raised in the United States where innocent U.S citizens were imprisoned 
by mistake because of a large scale fingerprint sharing program called Secure Communities. This 
program administered by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security wrongly identified James 
Makowski as an illegal immigrant and he was placed in a maximum security prison for two months 
before the authorities realized their error and released him. 
 
Disclosure of medical related information 
Biometric sensors may intentionally or unintentionally collect additional information (i.e., information 
beyond the data required to perform the intended task of biometric-based user identification / 
authentication, which may then reveal highly sensitive and personal information about the observed 
individuals). This contradicts the right of “informational privacy” that is, beside the physical and 
decisional privacy, one of the three elements of privacy every human should have [18]. 
“Informational privacy” refers here to the freedom of a person to decide who has access and is 
allowed to collected, process, and store personal information about him/her. One example where this 
right can be easily broken is biometrics-based on motor skills. Data collected via a distant video 
camera for gait recognition, may also reveal physical handicaps of that individual. This surplus of 
collected data could then be used to discriminate or intimidate that individual. This situation becomes 
even more of a problem when these actions are happening silently from a distance without the 
individual being aware of the ongoing process, or openly applied to vulnerable groups such as 
immigrants as well as the general public in the form of a biometric border [19]. 
 
The possible consequence that an individual will be discriminated against because of sensitive 
information revealed about him/her immediately raised the question within the research community, if 
“privacy” really is at the center of the problem or if the “discrimination” following an information 
disclosure is the real problem [20]. People are not put at risk just because their ethical background, 
age, gender, or sexual orientation was revealed from the collected biometric data. The discrimination 
and the social actions against them based on the data expose them to real risks. However, addressing 
this general problem of mankind on the social and psychological level is extremely difficult. 
Researchers working in the field of biometrics continue to focus mainly on how to enhance the 
individual’s biometric data privacy in the first place. 
 
To protect the individual’s privacy as much as possible, the following principles should be followed 
to address and minimize the above mentioned three privacy problems [21]: 
 Identity privacy: Binding of the stored biometric data and the individual’s additional identity 
information such as age, gender, etc., should be minimized and protected. A close, unprotected 
link between the biometric data and the other stored identity information allows cross-referencing 
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this information with data from other sources to generate, for example, more detailed user 
profiles. 
 Irreversibility and unlinkability: Collected biometric data should be converted into a different, 
application specific and non-reversible form before it is stored in the database. This prevents 
application cross-matching and the use of biometric data outside its intended original application. 
 
The following sections highlight examples of biometric modalities used today and what kind of -
potentially discriminating and privacy effecting - additional information can be extracted from the 
collected biometric sensor data. It is important to mention that the biometrics modalities and their 
corresponding biometrics sensors vary in terms of their actual usage in today’s available applications, 
complexity of the involved biometric sensors, amount of additional information that can be revealed 
from the collected data, and the risk to which they expose the individual’s privacy. 
 
Fingerprints 
One of the most widely used biometric modalities is the fingerprint. Fingerprint sensors are for 
example integrated in laptops to allow or deny access to the computer and used to identify individuals 
at border control or within company premises. Beside their original aim to reliably identify an 
individual in the aforementioned scenarios, research has showed that fingerprints or images of an 
entire finger can be used to reveal further information about the person (e.g., medical disorders like 
Down- or Turner syndrome). 
 
Research further identified a correlation between fingerprints and the sexual orientation, i.e. 
homosexuality[22]. These research results are highly controversial within the academic research 
community because it was identified as being far away from being conclusive [23] and also human 
fingers are formed during prenatal development which can be seen as well before sexual orientations 
are developed. However, its publication in a well-known neuroscience journal clearly attracted 
attention within the general public [24] and may have persuaded the public to prejudge people. 
 
Handwriting and voice/speech 
The handwriting style and voice/speech are further biometric modalities that can be used to identify 
individuals as, for example, used in the “SecurePhone” project to sign contracts on Smartphones. 
However, research showed that degradations in handwriting skills and changes in the writing style can 
also be a sign of the Alzheimer’s disease [25]. It was shown in particular that writing of cursive letters 
are challenging for people suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and that changes and anomalies in how 
they write cursive letters can be identified by a biometric system. This is in particular applicable to 
human signatures which normally contain several cursive letters and paths. Similar findings were 
published on the detection of Parkinson’s disease [26]. The study showed that two simple writing 
tasks can differentiate healthy individuals from individuals suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Signs 
of Parkinson’s disease can also be detected by visible speech impairments [27] identified for example 
through regular voice/speech-based recognition which has become increasingly popular. Technologies 
such as Apple’s Siri are used now by millions of people on their iPhones and iPads [28]and could 
easily analyze and detect speech changes during normal operation. 
 
But not only medical disorders such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease can be identified by 
analyses of an individual’s handwriting[29]. Research results have also suggested that more common 
and wide-spread social and health problems such as misuse of alcohol [30] or marijuana [31] can be 
detected via handwriting analyses too. This information about an individual can then, for example, be 
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very interesting to an employer during a job interview or to monitor existing employees and their 
performance. 
 
Retinal vascular and vein pattern 
Currently biometric modalities such as retinal or vein images are not widely used because these 
modalities are seen as more intrusive compared to fingerprints or handwriting. A retinal scanner 
illuminates the blood vessels in the eye using infrared light and then captures the reflected light for 
processing. This is seen as a potentially dangerous procedure to the eye and the eyesight by many 
people[32]. However, because of their high accuracy and advances in the scanner technology[33], it 
can be assumed that they will become more acceptable and popular in the near future. Nonetheless, 
today, available retinal scanners are already able to reveal medical conditions a person might have if 
the retinal image is examined by an automatic detection algorithm such as Automated Detection of 
Diabetic Retinopathy (ADDR) [34] or a human expert. Beside the given example of ADDR as one 
possible health condition revealed via retina scans, more than 100 genes have already been identified 
as contributing to human hereditary retinal degenerations[35]. This knowledge imposes a great 
privacy risk, as individuals might be rejected for certain jobs or have to pay higher health insurance 
premiums if the genes which are responsible for the retinal degeneration are also known to be 
contributing to other medical conditions. One such example is the USH2A gene, which is known to 
cause retinitis pigmentosa (a degenerative eye disease that causes severe vision impairment and often 
blindness), but also contributes to the Usher-Syndrome (genetic disorder resulting in hearing loss). 
This cross-reference could easily be made and negative implications could arise for the individual, 
regardless if this individual really develops a medical condition such as the Usher-Syndrome in 
his/her life or not. 
 
Similar to the technology used to capture retinal pattern are vein pattern sensors. A Near-Infrared 
(NIR) sensor illuminates the region of interest (e.g., palm) and the reflected signals are then used to 
capture an image of the vein pattern structure. An example of a commercial solution is the 
BASEmetric™ Finger vein authentication (VeinID) device, used in several hospitals in Ohio, United 
States, to help with returning patient identification. However, researchers showed that the captured 
vein structure can also reveal sensitive information about possible health conditions (e.g., palm veins 
can reveal the Hypothenar Hammer Syndrome (HHS) [36]). HHS is caused by repetitive use of the 
hand “as a hammer”, as for example in contact sports such as boxing or fighting. This knowledge 
could persuade people to prejudge individuals as aggressive or violent if the privacy of this 
information is not adequately protected and becomes public.  
 
The examples discussed above clearly show the importance of privacy within the biometric area and 
that sensitive and personal biometric data needs to be protected so that it cannot be used outside its 
original collected and designed purpose. The following section 4 introduces several privacy-aware 
biometric solutions to address the aforementioned concerns. 
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4. Privacy-Aware Biometric Solutions 
Over the last few years, several privacy-aware biometric solutions have been investigated to 
overcome some of the privacy concerns presented in section 3. As stated earlier, a biometric template 
is a sensitive representation of its owner that can be exploited in different ways to compromise user 
privacy. This section reviews several privacy-aware template processing schemes and highlights their 
pros and cons. It also presents other effective solutions such as match-on-card and privacy-preserving 
multi-factor biometric for local and remote authentication.  
Privacy-aware template processing schemes mostly transform biometric template feature vectors into 
other private (i.e., personalized) vectors and secure domains. Such transformations preserve the 
anonymity of their owners while maintaining the capability of distinguishing them from other 
individuals. Such processes protect privacy at the design stage rather than being an aftermath action 
adopted as an add-on service at later stages. Although privacy-aware template processing schemes 
have continued to mature in academia over the last decade, they have not yet been widely adopted by 
commercial and governmental organizations either due to the extra cost needed to incorporate these 
schemes or simply because user privacy is not a priority yet for such organizations. However, with 
increased public awareness of biometric privacy and security issues, biometric experts are expecting a 
growing deployment of such schemes in the near future.  
An ideal privacy-aware biometric template processing scheme must satisfy four properties [8]:  
i) Diversity: templates cannot be used for cross-matching across different databases in which users 
can be tracked without their permissions. 
ii) Revocability: templates can be revoked and new ones can be issued whenever needed. 
iii) Security: it is computationally infeasible to reconstruct the original template from the 
transformed one. 
iv) Performance: recognition accuracy must not degrade significantly when the protection scheme is 
applied. 
The concepts of revocability or cancellability of biometric templates and private biometric 
cryptosystems have been developed as measures to improve user’s privacy in biometric systems [37]. 
Revocability means that biometric templates are no longer fixed over time and could be revoked in 
the same way as lost or stolen credit cards are. The main approaches for privacy-aware revocable 
biometric templates are based on the use of a non-invertible (or infeasible to invert) secret 
personalized transformation of the biometric feature vectors. Private biometric cryptosystems work 
by generating anonymous biometric keys and hashes that can be used as a proof of identity. The main 
approaches are based on user-linked helper data (e.g., a secure sketch) extracted from the biometric 
feature vector. Existing helper schemes and secure sketches use a combination of quantization and 
error correcting codes. The created/extracted helper data should not reveal much information about 
the biometric template itself or from a fresh biometric sample.  
It can be argued that each of the above privacy-aware template schemes has its own advantages and 
limitations in terms of the level of privacy provided, computational cost, storage requirements, 
applicability to different kinds of biometric representations and ability to handle inter-class variations 
in biometric data (i.e., maintaining the accuracy [5]). Therefore, the requirement of each system 
should be analyzed before recommending the right solution. 
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4.1 Parameterized Feature Transformations 
The basic idea behind parameterized feature transformation is to use a function ϝ to transform the 
original biometric template to a private and secure domain. The function ϝ typically depends on a 
parameter or a key called a Transformation Key (TK). This TK is applied at the enrolment stage to 
transform the original template and generate a cancellable version of it. At the matching stage and for 
each recognition attempt, the same TK is applied on the freshly captured biometric samples to 
guarantee that the matching process takes place in a private and secure domain. Following this 
approach, revocation of a template simply requires a change of the TK.  
Depending on the characteristics of ϝ, feature transformations can be further categorized into salting 
and non-invertible transforms. In salting, ϝ is invertible i.e., if the TK and the cancellable template are 
known, the original template or a good approximation of it should be recovered. However, it is 
assumed to be computationally infeasible to reconstruct the original template using the transformed 
template even if the TK is known in the non-invertible transform. 
The TK can be user- or system-based depending on the usage scenarios and/or application, which 
enables privacy-aware feature transformations to be deployed in both authentication and identification 
mode. The following sections describe two examples of feature transformations, namely random 
projections and secret-based shuffling, followed by an illustration to demonstrate how feature 
transformation can be used in authentication and identification modes. 
4.1.1 Feature Transformation using Random Orthonormal Projections 
Several proposed schemes to produce cancellable biometrics involve the use of Random Orthonormal 
Projections (ROPs) to map biometric features onto private and personalized domains. ROP is a 
technique that uses random orthonormal matrices to project data points into other spaces where the 
distances among the data points before and after the transformation are preserved. The distance 
preserving feature has made ROPs ideal for biometric systems to improve privacy and security whilst 
maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy. ROP has been proposed as a secure transform for 
biometric templates and it was used to meet the revocability property [38] and as a standalone 
template protection scheme in a salting approach to generate a cancellable template for fingerprint 
[39] and face image data [40],[41]. However, a quantization step might be added to make the 
transform more difficult to invert [42]. ROP has also been used as a building block for generating a 
private biometric-based key from biometric data [43], [44] to be used as a cancellable template in the 
recognition process as explained in section 4.2. ROP-based transformations used to generate privacy-
aware templates are typically created as follows: 
i) Generate m pseudo random vectors or real values based on a secret key. 
ii) Apply Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization on the generated random vectors to produce an 
orthonormal matrix. A matrix A is called an orthonormal matrix if it is orthogonal and each 
column/row vector has a unit norm, equivalently AAt =I, where At is the transpose of A and I is 
the identity matrix of the same size as A. 
iii) Transform the original template feature x to a secure domain using matrix product: y=Ax. 
An efficient method of generating orthonormal matrices [45] exploits the fact that small size 
orthonormal matrices can be generated without a need for the Gram-Schmidt procedure, which is ill-
conditioned for high dimensional spaces. Let x be the feature vector of size n, A be an n×n 
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orthonormal random matrix, b a random vector of size n, and P a permutation matrix of size n. Then 
the transformation  
y=P(Ax+ b)   (1) 
defines a distance preserving mapping of the space of n-dimensional vector space Rn that enhances 
privacy while preserving the intra-class variation (i.e., while maintaining the same level of recognition 
accuracy) [45]. 
4.1.2 Feature Transformation using Secret-Based Shuffling 
Another example of a privacy-aware feature transformation is secret-based shuffling to create 
revocable versions of iris templates [46]. A shuffling key of size k generated from a secret (e.g. 
password, PIN, or a random key) is used to shuffle an iris code that is divided into k blocks. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, if a bit in the key is 1, the corresponding iris code block is moved to the 
beginning; otherwise it is moved to the end. 
Shuffling Key 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Iris Template 
Block1 Block2 Block3 Block4 Block5 Block6 Block7 
 
 




Block1 Block4 Block5 Block7 Block2 Block3 Block6 
 
Figure 4: Simple Secret-based shuffling for iris codes [46] 
4.1.3 User-Based Feature Transformations for Privacy-Aware Authentication 
User-Based Feature Transformations (UBFTs) are typically multi-factor biometric recognition 
schemes that rely on applying user-based transformation keys on biometric features. These multi-
factor biometric authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance privacy and/or accuracy of 
biometric systems. Figure 5 illustrates the general operations of a multi-factor UBFT approach during 
enrolment and authentication stages. Typically, UBFTs employ transformation keys generated from 
passwords/PINs or the keys are retrieved from a token. If a user is subscribed to x different systems, 
there will be x different cancellable versions of their biometric template by changing the user- and/or 
system-based secret. Arguably, this privacy-preserving approach improves authentication anonymity 
and makes it infeasible to track users across different systems or databases. 
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Figure 5: General operations of a Multi-factor biometric authentication system based on UBFTs approach 
during enrolment and authentication stages 
4.1.4 Parameterized Feature Transformations for Privacy-Aware Identification 
Clearly the above UBFTs cannot be applied in a biometric identification mode where the system, for 
example, is supposed to identify individuals on the watch list without expecting them to declare their 
identity or presenting any additional information. Therefore, the transformation key in this scenario 
should be solely a system-based transformation. Figure 6 shows how a parameterized feature 
transformation can be used in privacy-preserving identification mode. It can be argued that such 
transformations can provide a good level of anonymity if the transformation is selected sensibly. 
 
Figure 6. Parameterized feature transformations for privacy-aware identification 
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4.2 Private Biometric Cryptosystems 
Private Biometric cryptosystems have been developed to provide stronger security mechanisms and to 
create revocable representations of individuals by combining biometrics with cryptography. Biometric 
cryptosystems, also known as private biometrics or biometric encryption, use Privacy by Design to 
directly address the privacy and security concerns associated with biometric systems. Typical 
biometric cryptosystems employ additional authentication factor(s) such as a password, PIN or token 
to improve the privacy of a standalone biometric system by generating revocable biometric keys that 
are not permanently linked with the user’s identity. In general, there are three approaches to 
implement biometrics cryptosystems: (i) key release (ii) key generation and (iii) key binding. 
In key release schemes, both the cryptographic key and the biometric data are stored as two separate 
entities and the key is released only when the user is biometrically authenticated. This method is 
straightforward and easy to implement, but has two major drawbacks [47]: 
i) Biometric templates are not secure; 
ii) The biometric matcher can be overridden. 
 
In key generation schemes, a cryptographic key is directly derived from the biometric data without 
storing it anywhere. Such methods suffer from unacceptably high FRR [11].  
 
In key binding schemes, the biometric template and the key are coupled to form a biometric lock [48] 
in a way that makes it computationally infeasible to retrieve the key without previous knowledge of 
the user’s biometric data. While biometric data are fuzzy due to intra-class variations, cryptographic 
keys have to be repeatable every time. To bridge this gap, key binding schemes typically rely on error 
correction techniques such as Error Correcting Codes (ECC). The ECC algorithm is typically selected 
after analyzing error patterns of inter-class and intra-class variations of biometric samples. In other 
words, the selected ECC should tolerate (correct) up to a fixed number of bits (the so called threshold 
of the system). In key binding schemes, a cryptographic key is randomly generated during the 
enrolment stage but independent of the biometric template(s) and can be changed whenever needed. 
The Fuzzy Commitment scheme [48] is one of the earliest methods of binding biometrics and user 
keys. To commit (bind) a binary key K, a codeword C is generated based on K using a predefined 
error correcting code. The ultimate commitment will be (h(K), BL), where BL = B C is the 
biometric lock, B is a binary biometric template and h is a cryptographic hash function. To remove a 
commitment, an individual has to provide a fresh biometric sample B’ to be XORed with BL, which 
results in a codeword C’. If B’ is close enough to B, decoding C’ should yield the same key K where 
h(K) can be used to verify that the right key is released.  
 
Figure 7 depicts a generalized version of such a system [11]. At the enrolment stage, biometric 
samples are captured and input to a feature extraction procedure that outputs biometric template(s). 
Thereafter, a user-based transformation (e.g., personalized and private random orthonormal 
projection) is applied to transform the extracted biometric template into a private domain. Finally, a 
binary representation of the biometric sample is produced to be bound to the cryptographic key. To 
allow for the intra-class variations, error correcting techniques should be used whereby intra-class 
variations between biometrics samples at the enrolment and key retrieval stages can be considered as 
noise. The adopted error correction techniques should be capable of correcting up to a specific 
number of bits which depends on the intended key size, biometric template size, and the amount of 
tolerated distortion in the biometric data to accommodate adequate variation in user samples. 

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Figure 7. General private biometric cryptosystem (key binding scheme) 
 
The encoded cryptographic key is XORed with the binary representation of biometric data to yield the 
biometric lock or helper data. The key is then discarded and the biometric lock and the hash of the key 
are stored. At the authentication stage (key retrieval stage), the binary representation is calculated 
using a fresh biometric sample in the same way as described above and then XORed with the 
biometric lock. Next, the adopted error correcting technique in the decoding mode is used. The 
correction succeeds and the original cryptographic key is reproduced if the difference between the 
reference biometric sample(s) and the fresh biometric sample is within the predefined threshold (i.e., 
the fresh biometric sample belongs to the same individual). The predefined threshold is determined in 
the same way as before when defining a biometric authentication threshold through a training protocol 
that is application dependent, where appropriate tolerance of error rates is chosen in terms of FAR and 
FRR. 
 
Private biometric cryptosystems can theoretically be extended to function under the identification 
mode in the same way illustrated in Figure 6. However, incorporating error correcting techniques 
makes any identification process very slow. To improve the efficiency, a hybrid privacy-aware watch-
list face recognition system [49] can be used, which was successfully deployed for Ontario Lottery 
and Gaming Corporation Self-Exclusion Program. The system is hybrid in nature because it combines 
a commercial face recognition module with a private biometric cryptosystem component. To improve 
the privacy, the system uses two databases; one contains biometric templates of the commercial face 
recognition along with biometric locks, while the other contains personal and private information 
about individuals. A biometric cryptosystem is used to conceal the relationship between a self-
excluded person’s face template and his/her other personal information. The commercial face 
recognition is used first to check whether a freshly captured biometric sample matches any biometric 
template on the watch-list. If it does, the biometric cryptosystem uses the corresponding biometric 
lock to release a key that will identify the record of personal information in the second database. The 
templates and biometric lock use different biometric feature vectors to prevent interoperability 
between the two modules. 
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5. Challenges and Solutions – Current trends  
Security measures and technologies involve the collection of information about various people 
including their biometric data. This raises serious questions as to whether, and to what extent, the 
privacy of the biometric data owner (i.e., the individual) has been breached. A moderate level of 
invasion into an individual’s privacy is sometimes considered as an acceptable cost of enhanced 
personal safety and society security. However, the acceptable level of privacy invasion is not yet 
clearly defined in the trade-off between security and privacy. International efforts have been made to 
come up with a common understanding of the security-privacy trade-off at both state and citizen level 
to suggest best practices and guidelines to policymakers. For example, the SurPRISE (Surveillance, 
Privacy and Security) project [50] is a three year project (2012-2015) funded by the European Union 
(EU) under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for Research and Technology Development. It 
aims to examine the trade-off between security and individual privacy and addresses questions such 
as: “Does more security justify less privacy?” and “What is the balance between these two?”. It 
consults with citizens from several EU member and associated states on the question of the security-
privacy trade-off as they evaluate different security technologies and measures. 
The IRISS (Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies) project [51] (EU, FP7, 2012-2015) aims 
to investigate the development and deployment of surveillance technologies and their impact on 
citizens’ privacy and democratic rights. Another example is the TURBINE (TrUsted Revocable 
Biometric IdeNtitiEs) project [52] (EU, FP7, 2007-2013), which investigates effective solutions on 
how to enable an individual to revoke an identity for a given application and create different "pseudo-
identities" for different applications. The project suggested best practices for privacy preserving 
biometric data processing. Another example is the 3DFace project [53] (EU, FP6, 2006-2009), in 
which the objective was to develop a prototype of an automated border control biometric system 
incorporating privacy enhancing technology based on 2D and 3D face images. 
Match-on-card technologies and other user-side matching devices are examples of solutions that have 
been proposed as effective privacy-preserving biometric solutions due to fact that storage and 
matching of biometric samples are all done under user’s full control. However, more research needs to 
be carried out to come up with practical solutions on how to extend such technologies to be suitable 
for both identification and authentication modes. Other future research directions could investigate the 
feasibility of implementing privacy-preserving solutions at the hardware level. For example, is it 
possible to design a biometric sensor (e.g., camera, iris scanner, fingerprint scanner) to capture 
biometric data that serves the purpose of biometric recognition without revealing any extra bit of 
information to the outside? 
5.1 Privacy-aware Remote Biometric Recognition for Cloud Services 
The increasing trend of many business organizations, government agencies and customers to shift 
their services and data onto the cloud necessitates the need for secure and privacy-aware remote 
authentication schemes that are capable of preserving anonymity and are immune against fraud and 
identity theft at the same time [54]. However, the open nature of unattended remote authentication 
makes the privacy and security of biometric systems important issues. Hybrid challenge/response 
schemes that combine feature transformation and a private biometric cryptosystem can be used for 
example as a privacy-aware remote biometric authentication for cloud services [55]. Face modality 
was chosen for the implementation due to camera availability on almost all mobile devices and 
laptops. At the enrolment stage and to address some privacy concerns highlighted earlier, only a 
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cancellable version of the user’s biometric features XAC and a hash of a PIN used to generate ROP are 
stored in the cloud authenticator’s database as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Enrolment stage of the privacy-aware authentication scheme for cloud service 
As a case study, a user can use a Smartphone or tablet PC that has a camera to capture face images 
along with a 4-digit PIN to generate a user-based transformation key to be used for ROP. It is worth 
highlighting the fact that combining biometrics with the other authentication factors in this scheme 
enhances privacy while intra-class variations of biometric samples are preserved (i.e., it does not 
compromise accuracy) [55].  
At the authentication stage and after extracting the biometric feature vector and applying ROP, the 
resulting cancellable feature vector XC is combined with a one-time authenticator random challenge 
vector V by simple addition to produce a one-time privacy-aware cancellable feature vector XO, which 
will be permutated based on a permutation key generated from the PIN as illustrated in Figure 9. As 
mentioned earlier, due to the differences between the user's captured biometric sample and the 
enrolled biometric sample(s) stored by the authenticator, ECCs can be used to eliminate the effect of 
this noise. In this case study, a Reed-Solomon (RS) ECC is chosen to correct up to 30% of the 
biometric feature vectors. This 30% threshold is determined in a similar manner to define biometric 
authentication thresholds (i.e., a training protocol is used to determine appropriate tolerance error 
rates in terms of FAR and FRR). At the cloud authenticator side, if the correction succeeds, the 
process generates a key K’ that matches the key bound to the user. This can only happen if the 
difference between the reference biometric sample(s) and the fresh biometric sample is within the 
predefined threshold (i.e., the fresh biometric sample belongs to the same individual). 
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Figure 9. Authentication stage of the privacy-aware authentication scheme for cloud service 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
The fact that biometric systems by their very nature collect more information than just the individual’s 
fingerprints, retinal patterns or other biometric data has precipitated an urgent need for new legislation 
to enforce privacy-preserving measures on biometric data collection, processing, and template 
storage. At a basic level, most biometric systems will record when and where a person is at the time of 
a scan, not to mention all the additional privacy concerns we have discussed earlier. Although data 
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privacy and data protection acts exist in almost all countries, those related to biometric privacy and 
security are not mature enough yet, as they are still at very early stages. 
The problem of privacy of biometric systems cannot be attributed solely to technology. No matter 
how secure the technology is, biometric systems insiders, and secondary users as well as third parties 
such as insurance companies, employers, and financial organizations can become a source of attack or 
privacy concern. In other words, the problem is the combination of people and technology. Hence, 
technological solutions need to be complemented by a legal framework while educational- and 
ethical-based tools are required to improve privacy for all of us. 
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